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Renewing Christian theology with Levinas 
Towards a Trinitarian praxis 
 
Glenn Morrison 
 
Is it truly possible to renew theology with the inspiration of Emmanuel Levinas’ 
philosophy? I believe it is both a possibility and impossibility. The possibility arises 
when we can truly take Levinas’ prophetic thinking to heart and renew theology with a 
language of alterity. However, it is an impossibility too because we would need an 
eternity, the very consummation of the Reign of God, to discover a space and time of 
grace wherein language and ethical transcendence are indeed one. Granted such a 
paradox and even aporia for theology, Levinas’ ethical metaphysics resounds upon the 
minds of a growing number of Christian theologians. His development of metaphysics 
beyond the thought of Husserl, Heidegger and Rosenzweig has proved to be of special 
interest, especially in the domain of ethics.  
But despite this resounding, there is a resistance to accept Levinas’ critique of 
onto-theology especially from Christian theologians who wish to renew the ontological 
tradition of theology. The very conflict which many Christian theologians encounter 
indicates the great demand and challenge Levinas places to articulate and have a sense of 
God’s transcendence otherwise than being. And ultimately it is a conflict that all 
Christian theologians must persevere, and through which be tested and tempted. Perhaps, 
this mental suffering to search for a way to speak of God might just very well lead us to 
an encounter with what is beyond seeing and hearing, namely the word of God in the face 
of the other. 
At the risk of generalising, I wish to bring out just two instances of resistance, one 
lesser and one greater (of which there are no doubt many more, to which a whole study 
might very well be devoted to discern all the unique variations). Looking at the first, 
lesser instance of resistance, there are those who embrace Levinas’ thought whilst at the 
same time reconceptualising divine Being, for example, in ethical or aesthetical terms. In 
regards to the second, greater instance of resistance, I suspect there are Christian 
theologians who reject Levinas’ post-metaphysical thought in the continuing search for 
the meaning of divine Being or divine Gift; this can be exemplified by the radical desire 
to recover orthodox, theological ideas and premises in order to enlighten ontology, ethics, 
aesthetics, politics and economics1. 
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The attempts that appeal to Levinas for inspiration, I would argue, tend to limit 
his thought by reading him in a way that is too dependent on the categories of objectivity, 
being and presence.  But, given this temptation in which no theologian is immune, these 
attempts resound with theological imagination and an idea and hope of doing the 
impossible in theology. For example, with reference to Levinas’ philosophy, Michael 
Purcell engages the theological writings of Karl Rahner, Graham Ward turns to those of 
Karl Barth, Michael Barnes refers to Paul Ricoeur’s and to the life of Roberto de Nobili, 
while David Ford’s frame of reference includes Eberhard Jüngel, Paul Ricoeur, St. 
Thérèse of Lisieux and Dietrich Bonhoeffer; and, Michele Saracino compares the 
thinking of Levinas and Bernard Lonergan. In short, there have been a number of 
attempts to enrich Christian theology, praxis, dialogue and spirituality from Levinasian 
resources2. 
In contrast, some Christian theologians may regard attempts to use a Levinasian 
lens to enhance theology as an interpretation of Jewish categories rather than Levinas’ 
thought itself; and further, as a facile perception of taking Levinas’ thought for granted as 
correct. Another major like-minded criticism is linked to the possibility that using 
Levinas’ thought may in fact result in a calculated and even a tendentious over-
simplification of Christian theology. This suggests that Christian theology is in fact 
allergic to a Levinasian re-conceptualisation. As a consequence, any re-conceptualisation 
of any Christian theologian’s work using Levinas’ thought is unacceptable and must, at 
most, be relegated to footnotes. 
But despite the varying reluctance to accept the full logic of Levinas’ approach, 
we can ask why is it that the logos, the very discourse of reason, should be confined to 
notions of being and presence? Clearly, it will be my argument that theology must 
conceive of the logos beyond being and presence. If the word ‘God’ is going to be 
pronounced, a difficult condition of alterity is demanded, which, in turn, will demand that 
theoria and praxis must coincide. In a Levinasian sense, alterity or otherness refers to 
being made responsible by the other to such a degree that it overwhelms the intentionality 
of consciousness. As a result, the self is obliged to sacrifice for the other to the point of 
expiation. 
Analogy and the categories of objectivity, presence and being provide much of 
the language of onto-theology with the aim to make the mystery of God comprehensible. 
The use of analogy, despite its enriching qualities, retains the risk of thematising and 
limiting the divine to the realm of the human senses. In this regard, objective propositions 
might not necessarily be a disclosure of divine truth, but the language of totality, that is, 
the quest to uncover the meaning of being. For Levinas, such a quest results in an 
anonymous experience. It is a de-personalising presence because any attempt of 
subjectivity is ultimately thwarted by the ego-centrism of the self. For these reasons, the 
contribution aims to conceive of a praxis, an ethical Trinitarian existence or language of 
alterity in which the cries of the ‘widow, orphan and stranger’ might be heard. To do 
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justice to Levinas’ philosophy, demands that it must not read in accord with those 
totalising tendencies in Christian theology, namely ontology, analogy and intentionality, 
which we will be arguing against.  
However, looking beyond the conflict over Levinas’ critique of onto-theology, 
Christian theologians interested and inspired by the resounding nature of Levinas’ 
thought, are, for the most part, beginning to explore its possibility. Accordingly, this 
contribution is a prolegomenon or an initial entry to explore and discover the richness of 
possibilities and impossibilities of using Levinas’ thought for theology. Granted there is 
always the constant temptation to fall into onto-theology (of which I will no doubt at 
times fall), my aim here is to imagine a horizon for theology to partake of the language of 
alterity. Towards this end, I will set out to sketch an outline of a Trinitarian praxis using 
Levinas’ philosophy in conversation with von Balthasar’s theology. Hence, I will present 
a Christian reading and application of Levinas’ philosophy to Christian theology. 
 
Prolegomenon to a Trinitarian praxis 
 
We come, then, to ‘a prolegomenon to a Trinitarian praxis’. It is to be developed in the 
site of alterity, beyond the language of totality and presence. A first step will be the 
examination of von Balthasar’s theology of the eucharist and of eschatological existence. 
In von Balthasar’s theology of the eucharist, we find the following: 
 
“In the eucharistic surrender of Jesus’ humanity the point is reached, where, through 
his flesh, the triune God has been put at man’s disposal in this final readiness on 
God’s part to be taken and incorporated into men. Applied to the Church this means 
that, in the end, every exercise of the ecclesial reality is a realization (in Newman’s 
sense) of this event, which has occurred before the Church has come to be: the 
ecclesial cult is, in essence, a memoriale passionis Domini. This cult is a meditation in 
retrospect on the event which in the first place constitutes the Church, the outpouring 
of the bodily-spiritual reality of Jesus as the Son of the Father, his release from the 
confinement of his earthly individuality into the social reality of the Church, which 
arises only from Jesus’ outpouring of self”3. 
 
The passage assumes that the Incarnation, the Paschal Mystery, the Trinity and 
the social reality of the Church enter in their respective ways into the meaning of the 
eucharist. Jesus’ outpouring of self in obedience to the Father’s will expresses Christ’s 
alterity or kenosis. The eucharistic cult signifies ethical transcendence as the realisation 
or continuing enactment of Christ’s self-giving. Yet the problem remains: we cannot 
speak of such transcendence as an immanent form of knowledge in consciousness. 
Indeed, if we are going to give rational expression to the memoriale passionis Domini, 
then we must encounter it in the space and time of Jesus’ outpouring of self. This will 
serve to counter any form of theological imperialism or dogmatic violence in regard to 
the other. 
While von Balthasar relates eucharistic worship to Jesus’ outpouring of self, there 
is also the eschatological dimension to be considered. Von Balthasar is clearly aware of 
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this dimension in the Church’s eucharistic self-understanding.4 The Christian habitus, or 
corporate way of life, is not only eucharistic, but also eschatological. But can these two 
major elements of a Christian habitus be approached in a way not limited to analogy and 
experience? Accordingly, we need to find a context to position us towards a horizon of 
ethical transcendence. I suggest, namely, 2 Corinthians 6,8-10, in which the ethics of 
prayer resounds. Let us see how this context may lead us to approach the development of  
 
Trinitarian praxis 
 
In 2 Corinthians 6,8-10, St. Paul writes of the paradoxes which the servant of God must 
face in accepting God’s grace: 
 
“… in honour and dishonour, in all repute and good repute. We are treated as 
impostors, and yet are true; as unknown, and yet are well known; as dying, and see – 
we are alive; as punished, and yet not killed; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as 
poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing everything”. 
 
Commenting on this passage, von Balthasar explains that the paradoxes of vv.8-10 have 
their root in the Cross and Resurrection. He concedes that there is no easy resolution, for 
they signify the breakthrough into the realm of God’s glory, into that eschatological order 
which parallels the break with Judaism5. This is to say that ecclesial and eschatological 
existence must, in the same manner that the Trinitarian event supersedes the Old 
Testament partnership between God and the Jewish people, be located within the activity 
of God. This suggests a notion of transcendence based on being made one in Christ (Gal 
3,28). However, such a notion is betrayed to thematisation, namely its comparison with 
the idea of “the Old Testament partnership… superseded by the Trinitarian event”6. In 
contrast to von Balthasar’s distinction between Christianity and Judaism, Levinas 
identifies “one common destiny” evoked by a sense of alterity:  
 
“In the eyes of these crowds who do not take sacred history as their frame of 
reference, are we Jews and Christians anything but sects quarrelling over the meaning 
of a few obscure texts? Through two billion eyes that watch us, History itself stares us 
down, shredding our subjective certainties, uniting us in one common destiny, inviting 
us to show ourselves able to measure up to that human wave, inviting us to bring it 
something other that distinctions and anathema”  (AT 96-97/83).    
 
For Levinas, there is the need to go “beyond dialogue”, that is, to have the “maturity and 
patience for insoluble problems” and to have “the idea of a possibility in which the 
impossible may be sleeping” (AT 102/89).  This is the ‘difficult condition’ of alterity. To 
overlook the sense of ethical transcendence here is to be left with the impression that 
existence is reduced to some form of personal experience or ‘subjective certainties’. It 
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6
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follows that St. Paul’s words must be read as a discourse of ethical transcendence and 
sacrifice for another rather than an abstraction of distinctions. 
In this prolegomenon, my aim is to emphasise that the encounter with Christ 
includes an encounter with the other in Christ. We must not consider that Christ is a 
system of totality or a theory, but that he is always a person. Von Balthasar speaks of a 
person as a work of Christian art, Ford appeals to the experience of feasting, and Barnes 
focuses on the experience of dialogue7. But Levinas’ ethical transcendence calls each of 
these approaches into question: we must think from and for the person, not from the 
system of being. Here, Levinas’ thought and vocabulary can be a valuable resource in 
revitalising Christian theology. He teaches us of the inter-personalisation of 
consciousness as beholden to the other8. He does not reject the idea of consciousness, but 
conceives of it beyond the Husserlian formulation of intentionality and otherwise than the 
Heideggerian conception of truth as the unconcealedness of being (DVI 159-160/101).   
There are three factors relating to Trinitarian praxis: ethical transcendence, 
eschatology and the eucharistic life. These three factors amount to a prolegomenon to a 
Trinitarian praxis, which I will now introduce before expanding on each one. 
 
● Ethical transcendence. Levinas has come to construct his unique vocabulary through 
developing and going beyond Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology. In this regard, Levinasian idea of passivity and its modalities of fear, fission, 
diachrony, trauma, anarchy and persecution evoke the ideal of praxis. These concepts can 
be of fundamental importance in developing an understanding of Christian existence as 
Trinitarian praxis. Although both Ford and Barnes, for example, have ventured to use 
Levinas’ ideas, they have set out to use them in regard to being and personal experience. 
In a way that differs from these contemporary theologians and von Balthasar, we will 
employ a more explicit language of alterity. 
 
●  Eschatology. The language of alterity is linked not only to the Trinitarian life of the 
Church, but also to its eschatological orientation. The language of alterity and 
eschatological discourse meet in the encounter with Christ and of the other in Christ. At 
this juncture, Levinas’ idea of passivity and its modalities will come into play as a means 
to develop a prolegomenon to a Trinitarian praxis. 
 
● Eucharist. After making the links just mentioned, I will explore the connection 
between Trinitarian praxis and the eschatological and soteriological dimensions of the 
eucharist, and the manner in which they interconnect in a Trinitarian praxis. 
 
Ethical transcendence 
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To stress a key point, ethical subjectivity for Levinas is made possible when the self 
transcends its objectifying consciousness: ethics bursts open the discourse of reason to 
take it beyond objectifying presence. Any discourse on God must accord with ethical 
transcendence9. Levinas’ sense of transcendence appeals to the God who awakens an 
unheard of obligation which has affected the self since time immemorial. This ethical 
transcendence is overwhelming for intentional consciousness. It cannot contain the 
alterity in which God comes to mind.  
Though Levinas speaks of moral consciousness (DL 378/194), like Heidegger he 
tends to avoid using the term and uses others instead. Before all common intentions, such 
as the experience of joy and will in self-consciousness, there is the language of passivity, 
of a bad conscience preceding all intentions. Levinas presents a vocabulary for such a 
language, namely fear, fission, trauma, diachrony, anarchy and persecution. These terms 
are the very modalities of passivity and the language in which ethical transcendence is 
articulated and the word ‘God might be heard (AE 126-127/100-101; DVI 125-126/77-
78). Furthermore, they are perhaps the inspiration for the logos not only to be articulated 
in philosophy, but also in theology. 
 
Here we make only a brief remark on each of these terms:  
● With fear, responsibility for the other’s death and suffering becomes my fear (DVI 
263/175-176).  
● Fission is the occurrence of God’s inward voice calling forth the self’s responsibility 
for the other.  
● Fission is also a trauma because of the overwhelming surprise in which God’s inward 
voice has come to mind.  
● The divine inward voice is related to anarchy. God’s word is beyond representation as 
it comes from a past without origin.  
● Such an original divine address is marked by diachrony in that the past is never present 
to experience and being. Accordingly, the past might be only signified by way of ethical 
transcendence.  
● A certain persecution is entailed, as that the self might awaken to the diachrony of 
transcendence, as egoistic consciousness is inverted to become a moral conscience. The 
self is subject to a unique form of affliction when it begins to bear the faults of others.  
 
The Levinasian terms of fear, fission, trauma, diachrony, anarchy and persecution 
exemplify the difficult condition of passivity towards the other. But they also identify a 
context in which the logos, the very discourse of reason, might be articulated otherwise 
than through a theoretical consciousness. Taken together, they build upon each other in 
ever greater complexity to signify the non-phenomenal depths of solidarity with others. 
But these terms also identify ethical transcendence as the place and time for God’s word 
to be signified. We see in these terms a life that must be lived in paradox. For example, 
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the terms speak of having a sense of transcendence once it has withdrawn from 
theoretical consciousness. Also, ethical subjectivity is an unheard-of obligation, that is, 
we are obliged to be responsible since time immemorial. Lastly, for example, there is the 
paradox of the Good beyond being. In other words, having a ‘good’ conscience is really 
having a ‘bad’ conscience, one that fears for the other. These paradoxes are of value for 
theology because they exemplify a language of alterity, a language that aids theology to 
face the problems of ambiguity and paradox in the relation between God, humanity and 
the world.    
With the resources of Levinas’ vocabulary, we turn now to von Balthasar’s 
eschatological and eucharistic positions. Furthermore, towards keeping in mind the 
development of a Trinitarian praxis I will refer 2 Corinthians 6,8-10 (“… in honour and 
dishonour, in all repute and good repute. We are treated as impostors, and yet are true; as 
unknown, and yet are well known; as dying, and see – we are alive; as punished, and yet 
not killed; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having 
nothing, and yet possessing everything.”) to a site of ethical transcendence. 
 
Eschatology and ethical transcendence 
 
Von Balthasar singles out 2 Corinthians 5,11-6,10 for its eschatological bearing. He 
states, “The passage speaks… finally of the paradoxes – impossible to resolve in a tidy 
passage – of a radically Christian existence in the face of the Church and of the world 
(vv.8-10)”10.  He then goes on to say, “This is precisely what is to be expected from the 
union of Cross and Resurrection in the kerygma, and it is precisely this union which fills 
the human vessel …”11. Von Balthasar cites this text to demonstrate the relationship 
between the ecclesial and the eschatological existence in a Christian existence aware of 
the ‘presence’ of God in the Trinitarian-christological event12. God is known as present 
and experienced as ‘the human vessel’ is filled with the one mystery of the Cross and 
Resurrection. At every stage, the correlation of objective and subjective experience is 
assumed. On the one hand, there is the objective experience of having heard of, studied 
and believed in the Cross and Resurrection. On the other, there is the subjective 
experience of savouring and seeing its glory. This correlation is framed by the analogy of 
being since the creature exists as a likeness and image of the Creator. But here von 
Balthasar is faced with the deepest problem of his theo-logic. He must situate his 
understanding of God’s revelation within a Trinitarian and eschatological horizon13.   
Let us address the question of how a Levinasian perspective can be related to an 
ethical and eschatological existence. It goes without saying that Levinas, as a Jew, 
represents the tradition of Israel, which is an essential constituent of the Christian faith 
and theology. In agreement with Robert Gibbs, I wish to underscore the influence of both 
Judaism and Franz Rosenzweig on Levinas’ philosophical writings: “… the most 
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‘Jewish’ of his works are still philosophical”14. Indeed, Gibbs remarks that Levinas’ use 
of Jewish sources heightened his awareness of the other in ways that caused not a 
philosophical reduction15. Looking at Levinas’ philosophical discourse, there are explicit 
instances of an integration between the ethical and the messianic (EN86/60). 
Furthermore, many of his terms, such as passivity, diachrony, the immemorial, testimony 
and glory, provide a fertile ground to relate the ethical to eschatological existence. 
Despite Gibbs’ recognition of the Jewish roots of Levinas’ work, there is still 
room for confusion in interpreting his ethical metaphysics. For example, Gibbs uses the 
term ‘ethical experience’ to describe what Levinas means when he speaks of what is prior 
to intentionality and consciousness. Gibbs does not use the more obvious Levinasian 
vocabulary of, say, ‘passivity’, ‘exposure’ or ‘encounter’. Such terms, in this instance, 
can offer a greater clarity16.   
We press on then to von Balthasar’s reflection on eschatological existence. He 
states that eschatological existence cannot be located in a position between God and the 
world, but “within the sphere of the divine activity”17. This point suggests the self-
imposed limitations of von Balthasar’s theology: by confining himself to the sphere of 
experience and being, there is no space given to ethical transcendence. As a result, his 
thought reduces eschatological existence to personal experience and to an ontological 
unveiling of God’s revelation in Creation. But now let us bring von Balthasar’s approach 
into contact with Levinas’ ideas of passivity and its various modalities in order to remedy 
this situation. 
I wish to argue that an eschatological sense of ethical transcendence would signify 
the passivity of being exposed to Christ and to the other in Christ. Let us look at this in 
more detail.  
If the self is going to live out a Trinitarian praxis, then it must seek to transcend 
its common Christian habitus of experience such as feasting and savouring with the eyes 
of faith or even of judging with divisive viewpoints. Thus, the self should, as St. Paul 
indicates in 2 Cor 6,10 for example, have nothing, and yet possess everything. Let us 
keep this in mind in considering the Levinasian idea of passivity.  
By having nothing, the self is in a condition of extreme passivity to the other’s 
poverty and freedom. Inasmuch as the self possesses everything, the self is responsible 
for everything, even for the other’s faults, sufferings and death. The paradox of 
Trinitarian praxis is that the more the self returns to its identity of alterity, the more the 
self divests itself of its personal experiences. We see then a movement from personal 
experience to a fear that comes to the self from the other’s face. This fear is not an 
intention or an act, but a passivity of being exposed to the other. The passivity is so 
overwhelming that it causes a radicalisation of conscience, which gives birth to the 
discourse of reason. What, then, might this conscience without intentions signify? 
Beyond the emotions of being frightened and sad is the obligation to be responsible for 
the other’s death18.   
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For Levinas, the responsibility for the other’s death is in opposition to 
fundamental ontology in two ways. First, we have a reversal of Heidegger’s idea of death 
as mine (Jemeinigkeit) into responsibility for the other’s death. Second, Heidegger’s idea 
of state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) or, as Levinas names it, the phenomenology of emotion, 
is rejected. This is because there is more meaning to be found in the relationship with the 
other.  In this light, we can look at eschatological existence in the site of alterity. 
By facing-up to the fear for the other beyond the finitude of my death and 
emotions, the self, might we suggest from a theological point of view, can also face-up to 
Christ’s responsibility of dying for humanity. The passivity involved in this ‘facing’ 
signifies that consciousness has been pushed beyond its limits. Consequently, the 
passivity of being faced by the other in Christ is so overwhelming that the presence of 
emotions, specifically, fear for one’s own death, is effaced. Divested of self and 
possessing nothing, the self, like Christ himself, is responsible for everyone. Fear for the 
other now becomes the trauma of a fission. The eschatological sense of fission as the self 
lies in its venturing to be united to the crucified and risen Christ. In this fission, Christ’s 
inward voice is heard as the voice of the self, bearing testimony to Christ’s own 
eschatological existence.   Let us consider this further in the light of 2 Corinthians 6,10, 
“… as having nothing, and yet possessing everything”, when the full impact of alterity is 
recognised. 
On the one hand, the Pauline ‘having nothing’ signifies that the self must divest 
itself of self-centred emotions and judgments before the other. The self is commanded to 
leave behind these experiences as they do not lead to transcendence, but to the 
immanence of knowledge and totality. On the other hand, God’s reconciliation is 
everything insofar as the self lives for the other beyond its powers, finitude and emotions. 
This is to say that the other, and not the self’s experiences, is in Christ and in the Spirit. 
In the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Christ, God’s reconciliation is encountered 
through Otherness. Hence, the sense of possessing everything is not that of experiencing 
everyday senses and emotions, but that of being obsessed with responsibility for the other 
(the very transcendent emotion of desire for the other). Such a radical turnabout would 
signify being absolutely surprised, overtaken, by what has always been determined since 
time immemorial. Therefore, just as the Spirit had inspired in Christ a life of expiation, 
the Spirit, in the depths of the other also inspires the self to share in Christ’s expiation. 
The Pauline ‘having nothing yet possessing everything’ paradoxically amounts to the 
same thing. Being free of self-interested experience (‘having nothing’) is an 
eschatological existence of otherness (‘possessing everything’). 
We are not suggesting that the language of alterity should necessarily reject 
dogma. It subsumes doctrinal judgments within the life of ethical transcendence, for this 
has room for the ambiguity, immemoriality and the un-thematisable reality of God’s 
Reign. Von Balthasar has remarked that, “… there can be no Christian praxis not guided 
by a theoria as its light and norm”19. There is a problem, nonetheless, when Christian 
praxis is guided by the light and norm of ontological language and experience – hence 
our present emphasis on a Trinitarian praxis looking beyond the language of totality 
(objectivity, being and presence).  
We might further refine our analysis if we look more closely at von Balthasar’s 
idea of eschatological existence. He states that eschatological existence stems from the 
                                                 
19
 H. URS VON BALTHASAR, Theo-Logic. Vol. I, p. 22. 
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Trinitarian event in which God reconciles humanity in Christ and in the Spirit. We find 
here that praxis has a Trinitarian foundation. But if we are going to understand praxis as 
ethical transcendence, then we must let the encounter of Christ and of the other in Christ 
be our guide. With this in mind, let us look once more at the Levinasian idea of fission. 
The idea speaks of the coinciding of ethics and God’s logos. In this sense, the command 
of God’s logos is pronounced by the self in ethical subjectivity. Hence, we can say that 
Trinitarian praxis is guided by a theoria not available to experience. Such theoria is not 
the dogma of ontology and presence, but the word of God pronounced in responsibility to 
Christ and to the other in Christ. How, then, might we hear the word of God? 
Levinas has pointed to the other’s face as the locus in which God’s word is heard 
(DVI 127/178). Furthermore, the other’s face provokes the signification and witness of 
God’s word through the other’s otherness or disturbing proximity (AE 119/94). 
Following this cue, we can suggest that the other’s face is the non-phenomenal locus in 
which to encounter Christ and his praxis of doing the Father’s will in the Spirit. In other 
words, we should not conceive eschatological existence aesthetically as the experience of 
joy and feasting nor even ethically in terms of focusing on the experience of being 
‘altered or made other’. On the contrary, eschatological existence speaks of the self-
encountering Christ’s expiation through fear, obsession and expiation for the other. Like 
Christ and through Christ, the self has been ordered anarchically to expiate for another. 
As a result, the self’s consciousness is overwhelmed by the anachronism of a kenotic 
responsibility that is already past. In a Levinasian sense, the passion to take on the other’s 
persecution and to bear the other’s fault is the sign in which the very ‘donation of the 
sign’ is made. ‘Donation’ or ‘giving’ (la donation) in the Levinasian lexicon signifies 
what is beyond experience and explanations; that is, the self is gifted since time 
immemorial with the passivity of sacrificing for another. Accordingly, I want to argue 
that Trinitarian praxis is a ‘gifted passivity’ signified in the withdrawal of transcendence 
from presence. 
 
Gifted passivity 
 
Up to now, I have questioned the role of experience and looked to ethics to speak of 
eschatology and Trinitarian praxis. Looking at eschatology and ethical transcendence 
together has directed me towards the idea of Trinitarian praxis. Further, I have conceived 
of Trinitarian praxis as first passivity, a state in which the self transcends its 
consciousness to expiate for others. I employ expiation to point out the obsessive aspect 
of ethical transcendence which the self must reach to pronounce the word of God in 
responsibility to Christ and to the other in Christ. Now I wish to fine-tune the analysis of 
the self’s passivity by speaking of ‘gifted passivity’. This will help to stress the enigmatic 
ways in which God’s word is encountered through Trinitarian praxis.  
Let us look at the term ‘gifted passivity’. I write of ‘gift’ in the past tense to stress 
the diachrony of God’s word in the other’s face. Diachrony refers to a past that has never 
been represented in consciousness. With this Levinasian idea of time, we can begin to 
understand ‘gifted’ as that which cannot be explained and identified in intentional 
consciousness. If we take one further step, the idea of being gifted with passivity 
identifies the diachrony of a past that cannot be represented in consciousness, a diachrony 
of God speaking in the self. The implication is that God’s word is already gifted since 
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time immemorial and can only be signified in passivity. And looking at the other 
modalities of passivity, we can suggest that the self is not only gifted with the time of 
diachrony, but also with fear, fission, trauma, anarchy and persecution.   
In the context of eschatology and Trinitarian praxis, gifted passivity can be 
explained as follows: when the self encounters the Father’s will in the other’s face, 
pronounces it in expiation for the other, the self signifies that it has been gifted with a 
share in Christ’s passivity in the Spirit. At this point, the language of alterity includes ‘the 
difficult condition’ of responsibility to the point of a Christ-like passion of expiating for 
others. This brings me to another point to which I want to draw attention regarding the 
idea of gifted passivity. 
Granted that the word of God is encountered in passivity and is gifted since time 
immemorial, there is no guarantee that the self can articulate it beyond being and 
experience. This is because to utter God’s word through persecution and expiation is 
indeed a difficult condition. Nevertheless, the language of alterity informs Trinitarian 
praxis and provides an alternative language compared to the vocabulary of ontological 
unveiling and the transcendental qualities of being “as such”20.  For Trinitarian praxis is 
guided by a theoria not available to experience. A ‘gifted passivity’ alone can command 
us to a Trinitarian praxis. If we reach such ethical transcendence, then we might be able 
to speak of the enigmatic ways in which the word of God is heard and signified in 
responsibility. The combined terms of ‘gifted’ and ‘passivity’, although complex, is 
meant to bring theology into the place and time of Trinitarian praxis. The implication is 
that God’s word is not necessarily a dogma to be experienced. It is first passivity, and a 
gifted one at that. Hence, under the aegis of alterity, we can be led to appreciate that 
God’s word is an enigma and a gift irreducible to presence. 
It is a complex task to theologise at the limits of phenomenology. We also find 
this for example when Horner writes: “Not every gift (is) God, but it seems that God is 
only to be thought starting from the gift…”21.  It would seem that the brackets serve to 
emphasise the difficulty of using the ideas of God and gift together, and furthermore the 
question of whether we have to think God in terms of being (‘to be’, hence ‘is’). In even 
more complex language that also signifies the idea of gift beyond presence, Levinas 
writes: “The infinitely exterior becomes an ‘inward’ voice, but a voice bearing witness to 
the fission of the inward secrecy that makes signs to another, signs of this very giving of 
signs” (AE 187/147). We can begin to appreciate again, by using Levinas’ idea of 
passivity, that the word ‘God’ is not an articulation of presence, but one of a radical 
eschatological existence or, as I have come to construct, a ‘gifted passivity’. However, 
our account of Trinitarian praxis as ‘gifted passivity’ should not be isolated to 
eschatology. We must still consider how the context of the Eucharist will allow us to 
bring out the soteriological dimensions of Trinitarian praxis and its connections with 
eschatology. 
 
The Eucharist and gifted passivity 
 
                                                 
20
 H. URS VON BALTHASAR, Theo-Logic. Vol. I, p. 15, 269. 
21
 R. HORNER, Rethinking God as Gift. Marion, Derrida, and the limits of Phenomenology, New York, 
Fordham University Press, 2001, p. 247. 
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Employing the language of alterity in eschatology, I have set out to develop a 
prolegomenon to a Trinitarian praxis. Through applying Levinas’ ideas of passivity and 
so forth, I have constructed the term ‘gifted passivity’ and suggested its place in 
Trinitarian praxis.  In the state of passivity, the self is ordered to expiate for the other. 
The order is however a trauma overwhelming consciousness. This is because the self’s 
passivity has been gifted since time immemorial. This sense of anarchical being-affected 
arises out of being gifted through Christ and in the Spirit. But it is also in the space and 
time of sharing in Christ’s eucharistic life before the other that the self takes on its 
Trinitarian praxis of gifted passivity. How, then, is ‘gifted passivity’ related to the 
eucharistic dimension of Trinitarian praxis? To answer this question will mean linking 
soteriology with the language of alterity. To begin, let us consider von Balthasar’s idea of 
Christ’s Passion initiating an ontological shift. 
At the beginning of the reflection on the dramatic dimensions of the Eucharist, 
von Balthasar gives an ontological perspective on incorporation into Christ’s Passion: 
“After all we have said about the Passion of Christ being ‘for us’, there can be no doubt 
that those for whose sins Christ suffered and atoned have undergone an ontological shift. 
Moreover, this shift must be acknowledged to have taken place – contrary to Luther – 
prior to their embracing of the fact by an act of faith”22. The incorporation effects an 
ontological shift prior to any act of believing and knowing. In other words, Christ’s 
Passion initiates communion prior to the act of faith. But the notion of an ontological 
shift implied in being incorporated into Christ’s Passion would suggest an incorporation 
into the totality of Christ’s Being. It might appear that incorporation is more an 
experience of divine Being. Are we then to believe that Christ’s Passion initiates the 
presence of totality and the dramatisation of consciousness? We need to conceive of 
Christ’s Passion not as initiating an ontological shift, but as passivity beyond being and 
beyond experience, that is, as ‘gifted passivity’. In this way, we can discover that the 
Eucharist is not an ontological incorporation into Christ’s Passion, but the very encounter 
in which we are responsible to the other with and through Christ’s Passion. 
Von Balthasar’s ontological framework seeks to prove and explain that humanity, 
and the Church in particular, are incorporated into Christ’s suffering and death ‘for us’. 
The idea of incorporation identifies participating in Christ’s obedience and freedom on 
the one hand, and grace on the other. In this regard, participating in Christ’s all-
embracing mission perfects human nature and all its decisions and actions. But for von 
Balthasar, this is a freedom that, “…comes about through our being incorporated in the 
Eucharist that, in the Spirit, Christ makes to the Father”23.  In simpler terms, the Eucharist 
deepens the grace for the believer to participate in Christ’s triune mission. Given this 
Trinitarian dimension of the Eucharist as that which inspires praxis, I want now to think 
in terms otherwise than von Balthasar’s ontological projection of it. It might appear that 
the term ‘incorporation’ emphasises Christ’s totality of being more than Christ’s 
transcendence and person. In contrast, let us now consider the way the term ‘gifted 
passivity’ would help to clarify and deepen how the Eucharist inspires a Trinitarian 
praxis. 
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 H. URS VON BALTHASAR, Theo-Drama, Theological Dramatic Theory. Vol. IV: The Action, translated by 
G. HARRISON, San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1994, p. 389. 
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 Ibid., p. 406. 
 13 
First, let us see how the idea of ‘gifted passivity’ might bring out the 
soteriological dimension of the Eucharist. Here, we are asking how grace perfects a 
Trinitarian praxis, of having nothing, but possessing everything (2 Cor 6,10). Hence, 
contrary to the idea of being incorporated into the Eucharist, I want to suggest that the 
believer is gifted with passivity in the Eucharist. First, let us look at the idea of being 
gifted in the space and time of Christ’s Passion. I suggest that to be gifted is not to have 
one’s nature perfected, but to be anarchically affected by the trauma of God’s order to 
Christ and the world to be responsible. Let us now extend such a conception to the 
context of the Eucharist. 
In the language of alterity, we could say that the Eucharist signifies that an order 
of responsibility has been made through the time of Christ’s death, going to the dead and 
Resurrection. This is a time beyond the experience of having one’s nature perfected. We 
can say then that Eucharistic grace perfects the possibility of expiating like Christ for the 
other. But such grace demands a difficult condition. For, it is the Eucharist that surprises 
the self absolutely with the trauma of Christ’s expiation. Such trauma inspires devotion to 
the other’s hunger for the body and blood of Christ, a hunger namely for salvation, justice 
and mercy. Hence in the Eucharist, it is not my hunger for Christ that matters, but the 
other’s hunger to such a point where my hunger is the other’s hunger. We can thus begin 
to imagine how the Eucharist is a site of ethical transcendence in which the self is gifted 
with the Trinity’s eternal salvific plan. 
According to von Balthasar, Christ’s Passion gives rise to an ontological shift that 
must be acknowledged before the act of faith and points to St. Paul for proof (Rom 
5,8,10; 14,8 and 2 Cor 5,14-15)24. The idea of an ontological shift thematises the 
experience of Christ’s goodness as an essence in consciousness. In contrast to this, we 
would argue that Christ’s Passion evokes a sense of ‘gifted passivity’ so that St. Paul’s 
writings are not proof of any ontological shift, but rather articulate theology and alterity 
together. Before describing the paradoxes of eschatological existence, St. Paul writes: 
“For the love of Christ urges us on, because we are convinced that one has died for all; 
therefore all have died. And he died for all, so that those who live no longer live for 
themselves, but for him who died and was raised for them” (2 Cor 5,14-15). It is 
significant St. Paul emphasises that the love of Christ urges the faithful not to live for 
themselves, but for Christ. If we take this soteriological dimension of eucharistic living to 
be first ethical rather than ontological, we can see that it deepens and clarifies not the 
perfection of my nature, but the perfection of my expiation for others. The self is therefore 
first a passivity to the other’s hunger. Further, we can conceive that the Eucharist ruptures 
the experience of one’s nature as perfect. Or, in other words, just as Christ cannot deny 
humanity with responsibility, so the Eucharist deepens and clarifies the self’s 
responsibility beyond essence. Hence, the Eucharistic self exists through and for the other 
to a point where such passivity coincides with expiation.  
Expiation is a difficult condition, but I want to argue that it is a condition par 
excellence that gives rise to theology. This is to say that the salvific encounter of Christ’s 
suffering, death and rising to new life cannot be reduced to an essence in consciousness, 
but rather it can be discovered in eschatological existence. Accordingly, if we are going 
to grasp the soteriological dimensions of the Eucharist, the grasping must also be a 
passivity coinciding with expiation. The first concern of liturgy is not an aesthetic 
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feasting of the senses or a dramatisation of Christ’s Passion in consciousness, but a 
passion of taking on humiliation, persecution and trauma for another. If we take this to be 
true, then any soteriological conception of the Eucharist must also be one that meets the 
demands of eschatological existence. For example, when St. Paul states that, “as poor, yet 
making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing everything” (2 Cor 6,10), we 
could well imagine that not living for oneself may end up in a life of poverty. But for St. 
Paul this is everything; for when we live for Christ, we are rich. It is my conviction that 
the theologian is called to this very vocation. Hence, when theology rises above 
experience and essence, it might just cut through objectivity and articulate the word 
‘God’ in the space and time of ethical subjectivity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To this point, I have set out to argue that the Eucharist is not an ontological incorporation, 
but a trauma cutting across the unity of transcendental apperception and transcending the 
totality of being. It gives rise to what I have called a ‘gifted passivity’ or, in theological 
terms, a Trinitarian praxis. It is my argument that Trinitarian praxis starts from and for 
the other in Christ, that is, by way of ethics without ontology. For the inspiration of this 
idea, I have drawn particularly from Levinas’ ideas of passivity, the immemoriality of 
consciousness and of otherness. 
For Levinas, consciousness is not only experience, but is also a moral conscience 
beholden to the other. This conception of consciousness signifies that the other is not 
subject to experience, theory and cognition. Hence, the other should not be identified as a 
work of art or even reduced to an object of feasting or of dialogue. The other is beyond 
the event of being. Once we understand that we cannot reduce the other to the mastery of 
our own projects in life, then we can begin to articulate otherwise than experience and 
essence. However, Levinas, for the most part, holds that only philosophy, in the sense of 
being “the wisdom of love at the service of love”, is called to take this role (AE 207/162).  
In contrast, I have set out to argue that theology is called upon to do the same, especially 
when conceived in the site of Trinitarian praxis. 
I have stressed Trinitarian praxis in regards to ethical transcendence, eschatology 
and soteriology. By doing so, I have begun to renew Christian theology not necessarily 
with another theory of totality, but with the idea of theology coinciding with the space 
and time of Christ’s Passion and of the other in Christ. Accordingly, I began looking at 
Trinitarian praxis through connecting eschatological existence with ethical 
transcendence. I found that the non-phenomenality of the other’s face gave rise to 
encountering Christ and his praxis of doing the Father’s will in the Spirit. Furthermore, I 
argued that the encounter was an extreme passivity in which consciousness is 
overwhelmed by ethics. We were therefore in a position to understand that eschatological 
existence is first a discourse of ethics, a discourse without origin and a discourse coming 
from an immemorial past of the Trinity’s eternal salvific plan. I described such 
eschatological discourse with the term ‘gifted passivity’. If we break this term up, 
‘passivity’ refers to the overwhelming trauma of responsibility and ‘gifted’ to being 
immemorially united with the Father’s obedience through Christ and in the Spirit. 
Following the conception of ‘gifted passivity’ in the context of describing the 
eschatological dimension of Trinitarian praxis, I looked at it in regards to the Eucharist. 
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My purpose was to bring out both the eschatological and soteriological dimensions of the 
Eucharist and how their interrelation might give light to a Trinitarian praxis. On the one 
hand I argued that the dimension of Christ’s Passion in the Eucharist deepens and 
clarifies the self’s eschatological existence. On the other hand, I argued that any 
soteriological conception of the Eucharist must also be one that meets the demands of 
eschatological existence. In other words, passivity to the other in Christ is the ground, 
which guides a salvific understanding of the Eucharist. If we look at these two arguments 
as a whole, we have an understanding of Trinitarian praxis, namely that the Eucharist is 
the place and time of eschatological existence (2 Cor 6,10) and of being urged on the by 
the love of Christ (2 Cor 5,14).  
As von Balthasar suggests, the love of Christ that urges us on is indeed prior to 
the act of faith. But, I have found that it is also prior to any ontological shift, that is, 
reducing Christ’s Passion to an essence, an a priori presence or even an experience of 
goodness. It follows that the love of Christ in the Eucharist urges us on before the other in 
Christ and since the time of the Trinity’s salvific plan (Rom 8,3). This is to say that the 
Passion of Christ urges us to hear the logos of God on the other’s face and to articulate it 
with the reason and passion of expiation. If we take this to be true, we can discover that 
Trinitarian praxis is an optics for theology, to conceive of Christ and of the other in 
Christ beyond analogy and experience. Accordingly, with the term ‘gifted passivity’, I 
have tried to bring out how ethical transcendence might provide the possibility for 
theoria and praxis to coincide. 
In the course of the contribution, I have attempted to enrich von Balthasar’s 
theology with ideas resounding from Levinas’ thought. Furthermore, I have set out to 
articulate a ‘prolegomenon to a Trinitarian praxis’. The complexity of Levinas’ thought 
for Christian theology serves to teach of the priority of responsibility for the other. In 
particular, I have found the Levinasian ideas of otherness and of passivity most helpful 
for inspiring theological insight. Consequently, I have argued that God is neither an 
essence nor an experience. Rather, it is a difficult condition in which to encounter God’s 
word, one that demands a liturgy of responsibility to the point of expiating for others. 
Accordingly, we should not, as von Balthasar’s trilogy exemplifies, focus on Christ as an 
object of analogical thought, but rather understand Christ as a person of ethical 
subjectivity. Theology and Trinitarian praxis belong together. Perhaps then, when 
theology is both a discourse and a signification of the divine logos, we might praise 
God’s wonderful works in the place and time of offering sacrifice. 
Trinitarian praxis is an ethical event with eschatological and soteriological 
horizons. My conception of Trinitarian praxis owes much to Levinas’ sense of holiness 
and his ideas of otherness and passivity. Yet, it has gone beyond his original context. 
Throughout the contribution, my aim has been to use Levinas’ ideas as inspiration to 
enrich von Balthasar’s theology and to develop my own. Levinas’ thought has much to 
offer. Given its complexity, it will perhaps always be an arduous task to utilise it for the 
benefit of Christian theology. But I argue that persevering with such complexity can 
result in an important contribution. This has been the major aim of the contribution. 
Beyond the language of ontology, analogy and presence, I have tried to argue that it is 
possible to theologise.  
I have argued that Levinas’ thought is the very inspiration to conceive of a 
language of alterity for Christian theology in which we might come to a sense of 
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Trinitarian praxis. With such a sense, the way is open to enter into a ‘maturity and 
patience’ for insoluble problems. This is the eschatological path to go ‘beyond dialogue’ 
and to seek a union between scholarship and praxis25. Jewish-Christian relations could 
well be a context and a starting point for the Christian scholar to live out a Trinitarian 
praxis. Indeed, if the world’s redemption, stirring as mercy, kenotic love and friendship, 
is witnessed first in the reconciliation between Jews and Christians, this, then, could be 
the testimony that everything is possible26. 
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